Autor
Palabras clave
potestad reglamentaria
carácter discrecional
plazo de ejercicio
inactividad reglamentaria
control judicial.
Resumen
En el control de la inactividad reglamentaria, y tratándose de supuestos de omisiones reglamentarias parciales, los tribunales han admitido la posibilidad de condenar a la Administración a incorporar en un reglamento una concreta previsión normativa, siempre previa constatación de la existencia del deber legal de dictar una disposición en un determinado sentido, pero sin incidir en otros aspectos discrecionales del ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria. La STS de 5 de abril de 2018 ha enjuiciado un supuesto de inactividad reglamentaria total y ha condenado al Gobierno a dictar el reglamento omitido en un plazo determinado de tiempo, por estimar que tanto la obligación de dictar el reglamento como parte del contenido del mismo y el deber de promulgarlo dentro de un plazo específico estaban establecidos en la ley. La sentencia matiza así el carácter enteramente discrecional que hasta esa fecha la jurisprudencia ha venido predicando del ejercicio mismo de la potestad reglamentaria y de la elección del momento oportuno para su ejercicio. El fallo de la STS de 5 de abril de 2018 no debe entenderse fuera del contexto en que se dicta, y a pesar de que no todos sus pronunciamientos sean acertados, conviene resaltar la relevancia de algunas de las consideraciones que realiza, pues pueden permitir una ampliación razonable del alcance del control judicial de la inactividad reglamentaria.
Keywords
Regulatory powers; discretionary nature; period of exercise; regulatory inactivity;judicial control.
Abstract
In relation to the control of regulatory inactivity, more especially cases of partial regulatory omissions, the courts have recognised the possibility of requiring the administration to include in a given regulation a particular provision whenever the legal duty is found to exist of making a ruling in a given direction, but without affecting other discretionary aspects of the exercise of regulatory powers. The High Court
Sentence (HCS) of 5 April 2018 regarding a case of total regulatory inactivity has sentenced the Government to include the omitted provision within a given period on the grounds that both the duty to include the rule as part of the regulation’s contents and the duty to promulgate it within a certain period were stipulated by law. Thus, the sentence qualifies the entirely discretionary nature hitherto attributed by jurisprudence to this exercise of regulatory powers and to the choice of the best moment for said exercise. The HCS of 5 April 2018 should not be taken out of context, and while some of its considerations may not be sound, the importance of others needs highlighting since they may permit some reasonable extension to the scope of the judicial control of regulatory inactivity.
Sentence (HCS) of 5 April 2018 regarding a case of total regulatory inactivity has sentenced the Government to include the omitted provision within a given period on the grounds that both the duty to include the rule as part of the regulation’s contents and the duty to promulgate it within a certain period were stipulated by law. Thus, the sentence qualifies the entirely discretionary nature hitherto attributed by jurisprudence to this exercise of regulatory powers and to the choice of the best moment for said exercise. The HCS of 5 April 2018 should not be taken out of context, and while some of its considerations may not be sound, the importance of others needs highlighting since they may permit some reasonable extension to the scope of the judicial control of regulatory inactivity.