Autor
Palabras clave
libertad de circulación
matrimonio del mismo sexo
principio de reconocimiento mutuo
orientación sexual.
Resumen
La sentencia de 5 de junio de 2018 del TJUE en el asunto Coman y otros exige a los Estados miembros que reconozcan el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo contraído entre un ciudadano de la Unión y un nacional de un tercer Estado conforme al derecho nacional de cualquiera de los Estados miembros, si bien a los efectos exclusivos del derecho a la libre circulación y residencia. Cuando el derecho de la UE estipula que el disfrute de la libertad de circulación de un ciudadano de la UE con un miembro de su familia que le acompañe depende de la existencia de una relación jurídica como el matrimonio, y olvida que ciertos Estados no permiten el matrimonio del mismo sexo, se impide que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan ejercer el derecho de libre circulación debido a las restricciones que los Estados establecen a través de su derecho de familia. El reconocimiento de los cónyuges del mismo sexo como «cónyuges» en virtud de la Directiva 2004/38 es esencial para garantizar el disfrute efectivo del derecho de la libre circulación y residencia, pero también para prevenir la discriminación por orientación sexual y garantizar el respeto de su vida familiar. La conexión entre la libre circulación, en tanto derecho individual que deriva directamente del art. 21 TFUE, y la no discriminación por orientación sexual constituyen el elemento central para los ciudadanos afectados, y también nos sirve para evaluar hasta qué punto se puede afirmar la supremacía de ciertos derechos fundamentales que la UE pretende reconocer.
Keywords
Free movement; same-sex marriage; mutual recognition principle; sexual orientation.
Abstract
ECJ Ruling of 5 June 2018 in Coman and others case requires that all Member States recognise same-sex marriages for the purposes of EU free movement where that marriage involves an EU citizen and was legally conducted in one of EU Member
States. When EU law stipulates that the enjoyment of freedom of movement with a family member is made conditional upon the existence of a legal relationship such as marriage, and then forgets that certain Member States prevent same-sex couples
from marrying, the inevitable consequence is that same-sex couples cannot exercise their right of free movement due to restrictions posed by the Member States through their domestic family law rules. Mutual recognition of same-sex spouses as “spouses” under Directive 2004/38 is crucial, not only to ensure the effective enjoyment by Union citizens of their right to free movement, but also to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and to ensure respect for their family life. The connections between free movement, which is an individual right directly derived from the article 21 TFEU, and the general principle of equal treatment should be seen not only as a central concern for the individuals affected, but also as a test for assessing the extent to which the EU can affirm the supremacy of certain fundamental rights that it claims to recognize.
States. When EU law stipulates that the enjoyment of freedom of movement with a family member is made conditional upon the existence of a legal relationship such as marriage, and then forgets that certain Member States prevent same-sex couples
from marrying, the inevitable consequence is that same-sex couples cannot exercise their right of free movement due to restrictions posed by the Member States through their domestic family law rules. Mutual recognition of same-sex spouses as “spouses” under Directive 2004/38 is crucial, not only to ensure the effective enjoyment by Union citizens of their right to free movement, but also to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and to ensure respect for their family life. The connections between free movement, which is an individual right directly derived from the article 21 TFEU, and the general principle of equal treatment should be seen not only as a central concern for the individuals affected, but also as a test for assessing the extent to which the EU can affirm the supremacy of certain fundamental rights that it claims to recognize.