

**ARE SPANISH WOMEN LESS MERITORIOUS?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE BESTOWING OF CIVIL
ORDERS IN SPAIN**

**¿Son las españolas menos meritorias? Un análisis
empírico de la discriminación contra las mujeres en
la concesión de órdenes civiles en España**

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Abstract

The present paper represents an attempt to study gender discrimination from the perspective of public recognition of merit measured through the bestowing of civil orders—the single most important incentives awarded by states—both at the national and regional level in Spain. Our results confirm that there is a severe and non-converging structural bias against women in the bestowing of civil orders and medals, despite the fact that in many fields of awarding (such as the judicial system, the national health system, etc.) the percentage of women is nearly equal to that of men.

We discuss the convenience of introducing a female quota in the number of proposals to awards as a measure to overcome the current gender bias.

Keywords

Civil orders; medals; Premial Law; women; gender bias; Spain.

Resumen

El presente trabajo pretende estudiar la discriminación de género desde la perspectiva del reconocimiento público del mérito medido mediante la concesión de órdenes civiles —los incentivos más importantes otorgados por los Estados— en España, tanto a escala nacional como autonómica. Nuestros resultados confirman que existe un sesgo estructural severo y no convergente contra las mujeres en el otorgamiento de las órdenes y medallas civiles, a pesar del hecho de que en muchos campos (como el sistema judicial, el sistema nacional de salud, etc.) el porcentaje de mujeres es casi igual al de los hombres. Discutimos la conveniencia de introducir un sistema de cuota femenina en el sistema de propuestas a una condecoración como medida para superar este sesgo de género.

Palabras clave

Órdenes civiles; medallas; derecho premial; mujeres; discriminación de género; España.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The road towards gender equality is often a bumpy one. Gender bias against women has been observed and studied in different fields (Pujol, 1992; Ferber and Nelson, 2003; Staveren *et al.*, 2007; Folbre, 2009; Berik, Rodgers *et al.*, 2011; Pearson, 2012; Karamessini and Rubery, 2014, among others). However, to our best knowledge, the present paper is the first attempt to study the question focusing on the bestowing of civil orders, the single most important incentives of reward—or prizes—offered by the State.

Generally speaking, prizes have received broad attention, not only from economists, but also from related fields like sociology and law¹. This notwithstanding, interest has mainly centred on monetary incentives (for example, Stiglitz, 2006; for a comparison between both, see Frey and Gallus, 2014), as this sort of compensation allows the receptor to maximise its utility (Becker, 1974)², or on non-monetary incentives (such as business cars, better offices, etc.) summarised under the term “fringe benefits” (cf. Arzt, 2010). Alternatively, economic analysis of law has studied mostly negative incentives, such as fines and punishment.³ Nevertheless, one major category—if not *the* main category—of positive incentives used by States have

¹ An overview of these studies, which among others cover the economics of esteem, reputation, conventions, invaluable and positional goods, signaling, the giving of gifts, as well as the literature of incentives (particularly non-monetary, intrinsic and symbolic incentives), is given in Frey (2005: 9).

² For a general introduction to the economics of prestige and prizes, see English (2005).

³ Supposedly, “positive” incentives like tax reductions should better be considered a lessening of a negative incentive. From a legal point of view, awards and orders are

so far been almost entirely neglected both by economists and jurists: the awarding of orders, medals, decorations and other honours that constitute the so-called Premial Law⁴, referring to which already Beccaria lamented that: “Upon this subject [Premial Law] the laws of all nations are silent⁵. If the rewards proposed by academies for the discovery of useful truths have increased our knowledge, and multiplied good books, is it not probable that rewards, distributed by the beneficent hand of a sovereign, would also multiply virtuous actions?”⁶.

There is serious evidence that Beccaria intended to write a complete *Tract on Premial Law*, although he ultimately did not achieve this (Jiménez, 1915: 27). Instead, it was Dragonetti (1836) who published a *Treatise on virtues and rewards*. Nevertheless, it is Jeremy Bentham who might be considered the father of Premial Law with his work entitled *Théorie des peines et des recompenses*. Later, La Grasserie (1900) published an important article in *La Scuola positiva* dealing with this topic in which he (erroneously) stated that he was the first to introduce the concept of Premial Law. Finally, it might be stressed that probably the most important monograph on this matter was published by a Spaniard, Luis Jiménez de Asúa, in 1915, entitled *La recompensa como prevención general. El Derecho Premial*. Only more recently has the topic of orders and medals again drawn the attention of scholars, not only from a legal perspective (Fuhrmann, 1992; García-Mercadal, 2010), but also from the perspective of psychology (Fehr and Falk, 2002) and economics (Frey, 2005; Frey and Neckermann, 2006). However, the study of Premial Law should not be confounded with the phaleristics (named after the Roman for order/medal, *phalera*), i.e. the study of medals as physical objects, instead of the laws and principles that rule their bestowing (Frey and Gallus, 2017).

It is in this context that the present article aims to analyse whether the number of orders bestowed in Spain is equal in gender distribution or, at least, if there is a pattern of convergence among sexes. As will be explained later, this question of possible asymmetry has not escaped the attention of the

also a matter of the theory of justice as studied, among others, by Rawls (1971) and Sen (2009).

⁴ Occasionally the alternative term “Laudative Law” is found in the literature.

⁵ One “historical” exception might be pointed out: in ancient Rome public awarding was not a mere social act, like occurs nowadays, but was the plain positive equivalent to Penal Law. Regarding this, Ihering (1884: I, 181-182), quoting Titus Livius and Valerius Maximus, even affirmed that, at the end of the Republic, “[Roman] Premial Law was more precisely defined than Penal Law”.

⁶ Beccaria [1764] (1991: 83).

policymakers in some countries, who have adopted legal measures to raise the number of bestowals to women. Thus, this study will also allow the effectiveness of such measures to be evaluated.

According to the purpose of the study, the article is structured as follows: in section 2, we review orders and medals from an economic perspective to embed our study in the appropriate theoretical framework. In section 3, we present the empirical analysis, in which we test whether there is equality between men and women in the bestowal of the most important civil orders and medals in Spain. Finally, in section 4 we draw the pertinent conclusions and outline some recommendations for policymakers, considering some measures adopted by other nations to reach equality between women and men in the number of orders bestowed on them.

II. ORDERS AND MEDALS AS INSTRUMENTS TO EXTERIORIZE MERIT

The history of singling out from society those persons who have achieved outstanding merits—either civil or military—by distinguishing them with a distinctive sign (medals, orders, honours and other awards)⁷ can be traced back to ancient Greece, more precisely, to the late Hellenistic period⁸. Following the excellent study by Fuhrmann (1992) we can find the origin of this debate in Aristotle's *Politics*. The author, from Stagira, discusses the convenience of distinguishing publicly (τιμή) those citizens who had acted in favour of the *polis*, concluding that, although it might have a positive effect, it should be discharged because of the danger of abuse: "Although this idea might seem attractive, it is not riskless. It might, in fact, favour wrong awarding and cause political disturbs"⁹.

But these are the thoughts of a philosopher, not of a statesman, and we have broad evidence that civil orders were very common in times of Aristotle, and even about the hot-tempered discussions about their awarding, as proven by

⁷ Although in the present study we centre our attention exclusively on civil orders, for a matter of style we will use these terms synonymously in this text.

⁸ For the decoration of the Ancient Greeks (and Romans) see Kuhl and Kohner (1893: 310-312). Among the Roman awards, the *phalerae* (from the greek *ταφαιρα*) might be pointed out due to their similarity with modern orders. This is also the origin of the term *phaleristica* for the collection and study of orders. Anyhow, it might be remembered that orders were also known by other ancient cultures, as the Gallic *torques* reminds us.

⁹ Aristotle (1951), *Política* (Greek-Spanish ed.), p. 50.

the debate between Demosthenes and Ctesiphon in their respective speeches *Against Ctesiphon*¹⁰ and *On the Crown*¹¹.

The philosophical and social attitude towards merit has been crucial in several aspects that, unfortunately, we can only outline briefly in this paper. It might be sufficient to focus on this question from two perspectives: religious and political. Regarding the first, the theological merit reflects those actions which should receive from God a reward in the form of eternal felicity, the question being to what extent meritorious work and reward correspond completely or partly. In the first case, when this correlation is perfect, the merit is *de condigno*, and giving the reward would thus be just, while in the second—the equivalence now being imperfect—the merit would be *de congruo* and the reward would be a question not of justice but of equity.¹² Summarising quite a complex matter, the issue of theological merit might be reduced to the following question: can a person do any action or work that should deserve a reward by God? In this apparently simple question lies the main reason for the schism between Catholicism and Protestantism, as the latter believes in predestination, thus denying any possibility of a man to have any merit by himself, but only through God's grace. This is relevant to the point that Kunze, in his *Real Encyclopädie*, had no doubt in affirming that the "Reform was essentially a fight against the Doctrine of Merit"¹³.

Similarly, the distinction between libertarians and conservative politics, on the one hand, and socialist or communist politics on the other, depends heavily on whether they give primacy to individual merit over equity or the other way around. A form of organising society has even been termed *meritocracy* for those cases in which merit is the distinctive factor. Of course, the question of *what* is considered meritorious has changed through time and space¹⁴, as well as the appreciation of the different orders and medals¹⁵.

¹⁰ Aeschines [330 BC] (1969).

¹¹ Demosthenes [330 BC] (1912).

¹² See, among others, Marín (1715).

¹³ "The concept of merit in an ethical-religious sense, marks a fundamental difference between confessions, as Catholicism recognises man's merit towards god, while Protestantism denies it" (Kunze, 1908: 500).

¹⁴ This matter has been extensively studied by several authors. Maybe the best known example is the work by Le Maitre de Claville (1734), although attention might be drawn to the less famous, although more relevant book by Abbt (1768). For a monograph on the question of values and merit in Ancient Greece see Adkins (1960).

¹⁵ Gritzner (1893: v). Thus, for example, the Soviet Union awarded the Medal Hero of the Soviet Union to Ramón Mercader, the murderer of Trotsky, while Nazi Germany awarded decorations to many people involved in the Holocaust.

However, the question of discrimination in the number of orders bestowed to men and women has to date been almost completely ignored. Historically, the matter did not become relevant until after the First World War. Previously, orders were either separated into those exclusive for gentlemen (the majority, as they derived from the ancient orders for knights) and ladies; or a separate category for woman was created inside already existing orders, differentiated by smaller insignia to be worn on a ribbon *lace*. Step by step nearly all orders and medals bestowed by European countries have changed their statutes supressing any restriction due to gender. Accordingly, it should be assumed that over the last decades the percentages of orders and medals awarded to men and women should have converged towards a level of equality among genders. In the present paper, we will test this hypothesis for the Spanish case.

However, before doing so we should elucidate the difference between orders, decorations and medals. Orders derive from the medieval Knighthoods and the spirit embodied by the Crusades. Accordingly, they are organised in a hierarchy, that is, in several classes or ranks which are reflected in the size and form of the accompanying symbols (usually in growing order of importance: Medal, Cross, Commander's Cross (less commonly Lady's Cross), Grand Commander's Cross, Knight/Grand Cross, Collar). For their part, decorations are simply a sign of distinction of certain meritorious persons by the State or Sovereign, although the awarded people do not constitute a sort of collegiate body or "brotherhood". Nowadays, orders and decorations are easily and often confused due to the fact that the symbols closely resemble one another, although it is fundamental to clearly distinguish one from another (Jiménez de Asúa, 1915: 39-40). Medals are individual distinctions (either in a single class or in the classic bronze/silver/gold classification, though this, unlike what happens with the orders, does not imply any hierarchy between the awarded persons), intended to recognise either a single act of bravery, commemorate a single event or distinguish good conduct as well as long and/or valuable service. Another difference to be taken into account is that between *official* orders, decorations and medals (those awarded by a State, such as the British *Order of the Garter*) and *dynastic* ones (such as the Spanish *Order of the Golden Fleece*) on the one hand, and *private* or *semi-private* ones on the other (such as the *Order of the Olympic Merit*).

An in-depth explanation of the statutes and proceedings of awarding of each Spanish civil order covered by our research would extend the purposes of this initial study. Instead, we will simply draw a brief sketch of the

current Spanish Civil Premial Law System¹⁶. We might start our overview with the approval of the *Reglamento Provisional para la Administración de Justicia* (September 26th, 1835)¹⁷, the first modern attempt to organise the multiple coexisting laws regarding the Spanish orders and decorations in force up to then. Significantly, it suppressed the requirement of nobility (*hidalguita*) for obtaining the higher classes of orders. Nevertheless, and except for this point, the *Reglamento* obtained few results, and there still coexisted a great variety of norms and laws regarding orders—religious, military, civil—and medals. This chaos did not change with the next attempts, the *Real Decreto* of July 26th, 1847 (reviewed by the *Real Decreto* of October 28th, 1851), which aimed to definitively organise the Spanish civil orders and awards. The advent of the First Republic (March 9th, 1873) meant the suppression of the *Orders of Carlos III, María Luisa and Isabel la Católica*. However, only one year later, the Government decided that Republics could bestow not just orders but also honours. The return of the Monarchy with the proclamation of Alfonso XII in the city of Sagunt restored all honours and orders on January 6th, 1875, stating in the Preamble of the Decree that: “The spare and justified bestowal of awards will stimulate the effort of civil servants and, in general, of all social classes to obtain a sign that demonstrates that they stand out in the achievement of their duty”¹⁸.

In 1918 and 1925, two *Reales Decretos* regulated the system of Military awards, but it was not until the Government of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) that the next attempt to (re)-organise the civil orders was made. A commission was created which analysed this question and wrote its final report. But, once again, it was not meant to be. Shortly before the text was to be presented and approved, the Government fell.

In analogy to the First, the Second Republic again suppressed all orders (May 24th, 1931) except the *Order of Isabel la Católica*, alleging that:

Without reducing the Nation’s republican spirit, it is necessary to maintain the order [of Isabel la Católica] to evoke her name, the traditions and the perpetual greatness of Spain’s historical past, but also because international affairs recommend the conservation of an award to recompense such services and civic virtues, high merits

¹⁶ For an overview of the evolution of recent Premial Law in Spain see Ceballos-Escalera and García-Mercadal (2003: 25-48), as well as García-Mercadal (2010, 2019: chapter 14).

¹⁷ In order to facilitate the consultation of the legislative texts, we have kept their original Spanish titles.

¹⁸ Quoted in Ceballos-Escalera and García-Mercadal (2003: 28).

towards Mankind, the Fatherland and the Republic, or relevant merits regarding politics, science, arts and letters¹⁹.

Nevertheless, the *Order of Isabel la Católica* was complemented with the creation of the *Order of la República*²⁰, an order “without those characteristics embodied in the old orders that made them incompatible with the spirit of the new regime”²¹.

After the Civil War, the Franco regime took its time before restoring the Laws in force until 1931. The first steps were the creation, in 1937, of the new *Orden Imperial del Yugo y las Flechas* and the restoring of the *Order of Isabel la Católica* (which thus coexisted for a while with its republican equivalent).

On April 11th, 1939, the *Orden Alfonso X El Sabio* was bestowed and, in 1942, the *Order of Carlos III*, the *Order of Civil Merit* and the *Order of Agrarian Merit* were restored. Finally, in 1944, two new orders were created: the *Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort* and the *Order of Cisneros*.

If we now jump forward in time to the current Spanish Premial System, it has to be stressed that, according to article 62.f of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the awarding of all sorts of honours and distinctions is exclusively reserved to HM the King, thus confirming an ancestral tradition (García-Mercadal, 2010: 223-230). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding this clear principle, in fact it is the executive that confers decorations. More precisely, the award is always made in the name of the Head of State, but it is the executive that decides the concession: the government for the higher grades (Grand Crosses and Collars) and the corresponding Ministry in the lower ones. Traditionally, it was believed that these awards were completely discretionary; nevertheless, recent interpretations of article 106.1 of the Constitution and of the *Ley reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa* (1998) tend to interpret that all objective criteria regarding awards could in fact be reviewed by courts. This refers mainly to questions such as assuring that a person does not receive a higher category of award that he is allowed to, etc. Unfortunately, these rules are often ignored, and irregularities are no exception (Ceballos-Escalera and García-Mercadal, 2003: 74)²².

¹⁹ *Ibid.*: 30.

²⁰ For a detailed account of the history of this order, see Fernández-Xesta (2001).

²¹ Quoted in Ceballos-Escalera and García-Mercadal (2003: 31).

²² Several works, some of them very broadly, have studied the Spanish Orders and their statutes. Among them we might point out the following: Gil Gorregaray (1864-1865), Silva Jiménez (1906), Sosa (1913-1915), Fernández de la Puente y Gómez (1953), Calvo Pascual (1987), Grávalos and Calvo (1988), Lorente Aznar (1999), Pérez Guerra (2000), as well as the previously cited study by Ceballos-Escalera and

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE BESTOWAL OF THE MAIN ORDERS AND MEDALS TO MEN AND WOMEN IN SPAIN

1. DATA

For the empirical analysis of our study, we have used data provided by the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency²³, broken down by gender and exact date of awarding, and for a series of 39 years (1979—2018)²⁴. The dataset also allows differentiation between two categories of bestowing, namely the highest levels of each order (usually Grand Crosses or similar), which have to be published by the *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, and the rest (i.e. the lower classes of each award).

Accordingly, it is possible to run the statistical models for four differentiated time-periods (1979-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2018), the last of which, for the already stated reason of lack of available data, is slightly shorter than the previous,²⁵ and for two levels or classes: Grand Crosses and all other categories²⁶. Additionally, we have complemented the results obtained at the national level, with a brief overview of the bestowal by gender of the orders and medals awarded at the regional level (i.e. Autonomous Communities), using data provided by the respective regional institutions. In these cases, however, we employed time series of different length, depending on the date of the creation of the specific order and up to 2019.

2. MODEL

In order to check whether there is a statistically significant difference between the percentage of orders bestowed to women and to men (and after having made sure that in all cases the female percentage lies below that of their male counterpart, see Annex 1) a simple ANOVA model is run, according to the following hypotheses:

$$H_0: \mu_{Men} = \mu_{Women}$$

$$H_1: \mu_{Men} \neq \mu_{Women}$$

García-Mercadal (2003). To this, we might add several monographs centred on single orders.

²³ The complete database can be accessed at: <https://bit.ly/2LrVOax>.

²⁴ Despite affirming it contains data updated until June 2019, the dataset available on the webpage of the Ministry of the Presidency only covers up to 2018.

²⁵ This being also the reason why it is not possible to repeat the analysis only for the more recent years.

²⁶ The descriptive data are shown in the Annex.

It has been previously checked that the comparison is robust, that is, that the Levene statistic proves the necessary homogeneity of variances, a condition required for validating the results (see Annex 2a)²⁷. In order to avoid a distortion (“flattening”) of the means by years with no awarding, zero values have been neglected.

3. RESULTS

3.1. National level (central government)

Order of Agrarian Merit

Table 1 shows the results from an ANOVA testing whether the differences between the percentage of the *Order of Agrarian Merit* bestowed to women and men. Whenever $\text{sig.} < 0,05$, the percentage of bestowal to men is—at a statistically significant level—higher than that of women, that is, it can be ruled out that the difference is accidental. The results show that the differences between genders are statistically significant at the one percent level for all four periods.

Table 1. *Order of the Agrarian Merit ANOVA*

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1979-1989	Between Groups	26005.403	1	26005.403	174.339	.000
	Within Groups	1789.994	12	149.166		
	Total	27795.397	13			
1990-1999	Between Groups	17578.125	1	17578.125	450.000	.000
	Within Groups	234.375	6	39.063		
	Total	17812.500	7			
2000-2009	Between Groups	33611.111	1	33611.111	242.000	.000
	Within Groups	1944.444	14	138.889		
	Total	35555.556	15			
2010-2018	Between Groups	21160.000	1	21160.000	264.500	.000
	Within Groups	640.000	8	80.000		
	Total	21800,000	9			

Source: Own elaboration.

²⁷ As the null hypothesis in the case of the Levene test assumes equal variances, in order to proceed with the ANOVA it is necessary not to reject the null hypothesis, that is, that $\text{sig.} > 0,05$. As can be observed in Annex 2a, this criterion is fulfilled in all cases.

Order of Alfonso X

The case of the Order of Alfonso X—which is supposed to distinguish outstanding merit regarding science and culture—shows identical results, with all means between genders being statistically significant at the 1 % level for all four subperiods.

Table 2. *Order of Alfonso X ANOVA*

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1979-1989	Between Groups	34801.136	1	34801.136	120.229	.000
	Within Groups	5789.141	20	289.457		
	Total	40590.278	21			
1990-1999	Between Groups	27546.779	1	27546.779	91.467	.000
	Within Groups	4216.339	14	301.167		
	Total	31763.117	15			
2000-2009	Between Groups	15956.409	1	15956.409	72.983	.000
	Within Groups	3060.844	14	218.632		
	Total	19017.253	15			
2010-2018	Between Groups	5985.096	1	5985.096	22.801	.000
	Within Groups	4199.957	16	262.497		
	Total	10185.053	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

Order of Constitutional Merit

However, our hypothesis does not prove to be true in the case of the *Order of Constitutional Merit*, as shown in Table 3, where a statistically significant difference is only detected in the first period 1979-1989. Thus, we can confirm that this order is one of the very rare cases in which, for the two most recent periods (2000-2009 and 2010-2018) there is an equal distribution in the bestowing to men and women.

Table 3. *Order of Constitutional Merit ANOVA*

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1979-1989	Between Groups	9127.355	1	9127.355	916.554	.001
	Within Groups	19.917	2	9.958		
	Total	9147.271	3			

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1990-1999	Between Groups	35000.000	1	35000.000		
	Within Groups	.000	12	.000		
	Total	35000.000	13			
2000-2009	Between Groups	6479.339	1	6479.339	3.454	.100
	Within Groups	15008.264	8	1876.033		
	Total	21487.603	9			
2010-2018	Between Groups	3491.435	1	3491.435	1.617	.228
	Within Groups	25914.599	12	2159.550		
	Total	29406.035	13			

Source: Own elaboration.

Order of Carlos III

Regarding the *Order of Carlos III*—the highest order bestowed by the Spanish government (see Table 4)—a gender discrimination is observed during all four periods studied. However, it should be observed that, despite the prestige of the order, it is generally bestowed to all ministers once they leave their post, having thus become an order bestowed by custom more than by merit.

Table 4. *Order of Carlos III ANOVA*

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1979-1989	Between Groups	34801.136	1	34801.136	120.229	.000
	Within Groups	5789.141	20	289.457		
	Total	40590.278	21			
1990-1999	Between Groups	27546.779	1	27546.779	91.467	.000
	Within Groups	4216.339	14	301.167		
	Total	31763.117	15			
2000-2009	Between Groups	15956.409	1	15956.409	72.983	.000
	Within Groups	3060.844	14	218.632		
	Total	19017.253	15			
2010-2018	Between Groups	5985.096	1	5985.096	22.801	.000
	Within Groups	4199.957	16	262.497		
	Total	10185.053	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

Order of Civil Merit

The *Order of Civil Merit* constitutes the most frequently awarded order in Spain (however often overlapping with other, more specific orders) and thus might be considered of special relevance for the purposes of our study. Table 5 shows the results obtained in the ANOVA analysis. In each of the four periods studied, there is a statistically significant difference between the bestowing to women and men, clearly pointing towards the existence of gender discrimination, something that results even more paradoxically due to the fact that the order is awarded for all sorts of merits, i.e. it is the most “transversal” of the Spanish orders, so being free of any of the contingencies that might bias the awarding of the other orders.

Table 5. *Order of Civil Merit ANOVA*

Percentage						
<i>Period</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1979-1989	Between Groups	45001.928	1	45001.928	1758.592	.000
	Within Groups	511.795	20	25.590		
	Total	45513.723	21			
1990-1999	Between Groups	37170.181	1	37170.181	2788.797	.000
	Within Groups	239.911	18	13.328		
	Total	37410.092	19			
2000-2009	Between Groups	24793.587	1	24793.587	445.275	.000
	Within Groups	1002.268	18	55.682		
	Total	25795.855	19			
2010-2018	Between Groups	18667.455	1	18667.455	95.291	.000
	Within Groups	3134.395	16	195.900		
	Total	21801.851	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

Order of Isabel la Católica

The *Order of Isabel la Católica* corresponds to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, thus, is more often bestowed to foreigners. This should be considered when interpreting the results shown in Table 6. Again, signifi-

cant differences disfavouring women become evident in all the subperiods studied.

Table 6. *Order of Isabel la Católica ANOVA*

Percentage						
<i>Period</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1979-1989	Between Groups	27883.446	1	27883.446	746.530	.000
	Within Groups	747.015	20	37.351		
	Total	28630.461	21			
1990-1999	Between Groups	29649.142	1	29649.142	987.355	.000
	Within Groups	540.520	18	30.029		
	Total	30189.661	19			
2000-2009	Between Groups	21223.385	1	21223.385	809.448	.000
	Within Groups	471.952	18	26.220		
	Total	21695.337	19			
2010-2018	Between Groups	22727.491	1	22727.491	124.549	.000
	Within Groups	2919.648	16	182.478		
	Total	25647.139	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort

Finally, the *Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort*—exclusively awarded to members of the judicial power, in which women and men are nearly equally represented—shows, this notwithstanding, a statistically significant difference in the bestowing among genders (see Table 7).

Table 7. *Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort ANOVA*

Percentage						
<i>Period</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1979-1989	Between Groups	53472.297	1	53472.297	9940.500	.000
	Within Groups	107.585	20	5.379		
	Total	53579.882	21			

Percentage						
Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1990-1999	Between Groups	34390.579	1	34390.579	148.302	.000
	Within Groups	4174.126	18	231.896		
	Total	38564.705	19			
2000-2009	Between Groups	34506.874	1	34506.874	493.771	.000
	Within Groups	1118.150	16	69.884		
	Total	35625.024	17			
2010-2018	Between Groups	29361.440	1	29361.440	99.261	.000
	Within Groups	4732.790	16	295.799		
	Total	34094.230	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

Now, the question may arise about whether the bias against women in the bestowal of civil orders in Spain which has been empirically evidenced, might only occur in the higher classes of the orders, arguing that the bias might derive from a historical “conservative” and “patriarchal” imprint. Thus, we considered it worth to check the same hypothesis above stated for the case of the lower classes of each order (exception made of the *Order of the Constitutional Merit* which consists only of one class and, thus, strictly speaking does actually not constitute an order, but a medal)²⁸.

The results thus obtained are summarised (in order not to unnecessarily exceed the extent of the article) in Table 8²⁹. As can be observed, again in all cases a statistically significant difference discriminating women in the bestowal of order is detected, which may suggest that the above described bias is actually a structural one, that is, is due to the system of proposal and approval of the bestowal.

²⁸ See above.

²⁹ Again, the Levene test does not allow rejection of the null hypothesis of equal variances (exception made for the lower orders of Alfonso X in the 2010-2018 period), thus validating the ANOVA analysis (see Annex 2b).

Table 8. *Lower classes of all orders ANOVA*

Percentage							
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Order of Agrarian Merit	1979-1989	Between Groups	29700.908	1	29700.908	324.535	.000
		Within Groups	1830.369	20	91.518		
		Total	31531.277	21			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	26208.908	1	26208.908	191.191	.000
		Within Groups	2467.485	18	137.082		
		Total	28676.393	19			
	2000-2009	Between Groups	12805.794	1	12805.794	36.371	.000
		Within Groups	5633.438	16	352.090		
		Total	18439.232	17			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	4592.310	1	4592.310	43.150	.001
		Within Groups	638.557	6	106.426		
		Total	5230.867	7			
Order of Alfonso X	1979-1989	Between Groups	9972.386	1	9972.386	42.124	.000
		Within Groups	3787.849	16	236.741		
		Total	13760.235	17			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	11615.357	1	11615.357	83.080	.000
		Within Groups	2236.940	16	139.809		
		Total	13852.296	17			
	2000-2009	Between Groups	10588.543	1	10588.543	111.267	.000
		Within Groups	1522.609	16	95.163		
		Total	12111.152	17			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	8538.908	1	8538.908	51.274	.000
		Within Groups	2664.536	16	166.534		
		Total	11203.444	17			
Order of Carlos III	1979-1989	Between Groups	35875.360	1	35875.360	519.254	.000
		Within Groups	1105.442	16	69.090		
		Total	36980.802	17			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	47183.673	1	47183.673	2312.000	.000
		Within Groups	367.347	18	20.408		
		Total	47551.020	19			

Percentage							
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Order of Carlos III	2000-2009	Between Groups	42524.691	1	42524.691	1024.810	.000
		Within Groups	746.914	18	41.495		
		Total	43271.605	19			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	27045.518	1	27045.518	357.363	.000
		Within Groups	1210.892	16	75.681		
		Total	28256.410	17			
Order of the Civil Merit	1979-1989	Between Groups	17621.591	1	17621.591	553.845	.000
		Within Groups	636.337	20	31.817		
		Total	18257.928	21			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	17185.778	1	17185.778	552.014	.000
		Within Groups	560.392	18	31.133		
		Total	17746.170	19			
	2000-2009	Between Groups	16024.207	1	16024.207	2300.143	.000
		Within Groups	125.399	18	6.967		
		Total	16149.606	19			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	17766.475	1	17766.475	274.358	.000
		Within Groups	1036.106	16	64.757		
		Total	18802.581	17			
Order of Isabel la Católica	1979-1989	Between Groups	14304.770	1	14304.770	298.306	.000
		Within Groups	959.068	20	47.953		
		Total	15263.838	21			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	10782.993	1	10782.993	796.699	.000
		Within Groups	243.623	18	13.535		
		Total	11026.615	19			
	2000-2009	Between Groups	12098.037	1	12098.037	1335.647	.000
		Within Groups	163.041	18	9.058		
		Total	12261.078	19			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	12927.201	1	12927.201	99.831	.000
		Within Groups	2071.847	16	129.490		
		Total	14999.049	17			

Percentage							
Order	Period		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort	1979-1989	Between Groups	33151.629	1	33151.629	3794.012	.000
		Within Groups	174.758	20	8.738		
		Total	33326.387	21			
	1990-1999	Between Groups	19158.129	1	19158.129	3483.561	.000
		Within Groups	98.992	18	5.500		
		Total	19257.121	19			
	2000-2009	Between Groups	13282,191	1	13282,191	200,059	,000
		Within Groups	1195,044	18	66,391		
		Total	14477,235	19			
	2010-2018	Between Groups	8032,357	1	8032,357	177,217	,000
		Within Groups	725,201	16	45,325		
		Total	8757,558	17			

Source: Own elaboration.

3.2. Regional level (Autonomous Communities)

So far, the results obtained show clear evidence of the presence of a (statistically significant) bias against women in the bestowal of civil orders by the Spanish central government. However, as Spain is a highly decentralized country, it is worth also taking a glance at those other medals and awards bestowed by the regional authorities (i.e. by the Autonomous Communities). In comparison to the study carried out in the previous section, carrying out an econometric analysis is more complicated as the date of creation of the different regional awards varies greatly, thus making a direct comparison more difficult. Also, the Spanish Regional Premial System is quite complicated, as it lacks a common framework—under the legal form of a *Reglamento*, the different territorial entities set the criteria according to which citizens should be rewarded, the most usual including public and solemn recognition for different reasons, contributing to the improvement of the Community's image or reinforcing democratic legitimacy (Portugal Bueno, 2017: 159-161)—thus further hindering any attempt at comparison.

Table 9. *Percentages of regional orders and medals bestowed to women (synopsis)*

Autonomous Community	Decoration	Legal regulation	Total ³⁰	Men	Women	% Women
Galicia	Medal of Galicia ³¹	Decreto 1/1991, of January 11th	327	303	24	7.34
Formato d	Medal of Asturias	Ley 4/1986, of May 15th	18 ³²	18	0	0.00
Cantabria	Medal of Cantabria	Ley 2/1987, of March 6th			0	0.00
País Vasco	Cross of the “Árbol de Gernika”	Decreto 86/1983, of May 2nd	8	8	0	0.00
La Rioja	Medal of La Rioja ³³	Decreto 21/1985, of May 17th	26	25	1	3.85
Navarra	Cross of “Carlos III el Noble” de Navarra”	Decreto Foral 104/1997, of April 14th	61	36	25	40.98
	Golden Medal of Navarra	Decreto Foral 38/2018, of May 23rd	24	22	2	8.33
Aragón	Medal of Aragon	Decreto 229/2012, of October 23rd	16	15	1	6.25
	“Juan de Lanuza” Medal	Resolución of 2018/ October 30th	3	3	0	0.00

³⁰ The number refers only to the bestowal to natural persons.

³¹ The *Golden Medal of Galicia*, created by *Decreto* 98/1984, of April 12th was transformed into the *Medal of Galicia* by *Decreto* 1/1991, of January 11th.

³² In the gold-class.

³³ The *Ley* 1/2001, of March 16th *reguladora de los Honores, Distinciones y Protocolo de la Comunidad Autónoma de La Rioja* derogated both the *Reglamento de Protocolo, Honores y Distinciones* of the extinct Provincial Council of Logroño, and the more recent *Decreto* 21/1985, of May 17th that established the Medals of the Autonomous Community. The current regulation restricts the *Medal of La Rioja* to “entities” (i.e. legal persons).

Autonomous Community	Decoration	Legal regulation	Total ³⁰	Men	Women	% Women
Aragón	Medal of Human Values	Resolución of 2018/ October 30th	22	19	3	13.64
	Medal of Agrarian Merit		9	7	2	22.22
	Medal of Cultural Merit		32	25	7	21.88
	Medal of Professional Merit		23	18	5	21.74
	Medal of Sport Merit		26	19	7	26.92
	Medal of Aragonese Education		2	2	0	0.00
	Medal of Tourist Merit		8	8	0	0.00
	Medal of the “Justicia de Aragón”		1	0	1	100.00
Cataluña	Golden Medal of the “Generalidad de Cataluña”	Decreto 22/2012, of February 28th	68	61	7	10.29
	Cross of “Sant Jordi”	Decreto 457/1981, of December 18th	114 ³⁴	69	45	39.47
Comunidad Valenciana	High Distinction of the “Generalidad Valenciana”	Decreto 28/1986, of March 19th	54	48	6	11.11
	Order of Jaume I	Decreto 12/2008, of February 1st	45 ³⁵	40	5	11.11

³⁴ Number referred to the last four years.

³⁵ In the “Grand Cross” category.

Autonomous Community	Decoration	Legal regulation	Total ³⁰	Men	Women	% Women
Comunidad Valenciana	Distinction of the Generalidad Valenciana to Cultural Merit	Decreto 35/1986, of March 10th	72	57	15	20.83
	Distinction of the Generalidad Valenciana	Decreto 174/2007, of October 5th	15	7	8	53.33
	Ambassador of the Comunidad Valenciana	Decreto 247/2003, of December 5th	5	5	0	0.00
	Distinction Scientific Merit	Decreto 152/2010, of October 1st	13	7	9	69.23
	Medal of Sport Merit	Decreto 120/2014, of July 18 th	102	73	29	28.43
	Distinction Business and Social Merit	Decreto 131/2016, of October 7 th	7	5	2	28.57
	Distinction Merit for Actions in favour of Equality and for an Inclusive Society	Decreto 132/2016, of October 7 th	3	1	2	66.67
	Distinction "Joan Lluís Vives" of the Valencian contribution to the construction of Europe	Decreto 129/2017, of October 7th	9	6	3	33.33
Andalucía	Medal of Andalucía	Decreto 117/1985, of June 5th	299	213	86	28.76

Autonomous Community	Decoration	Legal regulation	Total ³⁰	Men	Women	% Women
Extremadura	Medal of Extremadura	Decreto 177/2013, of September 24th	102	78	24	23.53
Castilla y León	Medal of Castilla-León	Decreto 219/1997, of November 6th	7	7	0	0.00
Murcia	Medal of Murcia	Ley 7/1985, of November 8th	65 ³⁶	63	2	3.08
Castilla La Mancha	Golden Medal of Castilla-La Mancha	Decreto 75/1992, of May 12th	50	40	10	20.00
Comunidad de Madrid	Medal of the “Comunidad de Madrid”	Ley 3/1985, of March 22nd	47 ³⁷	43	4	8.51
	Order of “Dos de Mayo”	Decreto 9/2006, of November 2nd	73 ³⁸	62	11	15.07
Islas Baleares	Golden Medal of the Comunidad Autónoma de Islas Baleares	Decreto 2/2014, of January 10th	61	55	6	9.84
	Distinction “Cornelius Atticus”	Decreto 22/1996, of February 25th	33 ³⁹	30	3	9.09
Canarias	Golden Medal of Canarias	Decreto 76/1986, of May 9th	132	105	27	20.45

Source: Own elaboration.

³⁶ In the gold class.

³⁷ In the gold class.

³⁸ Grand Crosses.

³⁹ This number corresponds to the period between the creation of the award and 2016, as from 2017 onwards the call for concession distinguishes two separate categories: male and female.

Accordingly, Table 9 simply gives a synoptic overview of the different awards bestowed by the Autonomous Communities, their legal regulation, and the number of bestowals by gender. As can be observed by the data contained in the last column, only five distinctions—the *Cross of Carlos III el Noble* of Navarre; the *Cross of Sant Jordi* of Catalonia (which almost reaches 40%); the *Distinction of the Generalidad Valenciana*; the *Distinction to the Scientific Merit*; and the *Distinction to Merit for Actions in favour of Equality and for an Inclusive Society*⁴⁰—do not present a gender bias against women. All three of the Community of Valencia reach a minimum of 40% of bestowal to women, thus not presenting a gender bias favouring men.⁴¹ In other words, the bias against women detected in the case of the national orders is repeated in the awards bestowed by regional authorities, despite all of them having been created after the approval of the Spanish Constitution. Thus, this result not only reinforces the conclusions reached in the previous section, but also underpins the idea of this bias being structural.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil orders and medals are the most important positive incentives to merit and virtue with which a nation can distinguish its citizens. Therefore, special care should be taken in guaranteeing that—in mean terms—any gender discrimination in the number of bestowals is avoided. However, our evidence in the case of Spain—both at the national (including all orders in all their classes) and the regional level—the percentage of awards to women lies (at a statistically significant level) below that of men, up to the point that it may be affirmed that the given bias is structural. Even worse, in some cases there is no proof that there is a significant convergence over time.

In this sense, it is significant that the UK, France and Germany have at some moment in time adopted measures to favour equality in the bestowal to women and men. So, for example, between 1965 and 2004 the percentage of orders awarded to women in Great Britain shifted from 16 to 35 (Phillips, 2004:73).⁴² Also, the German *Bundesverdienstkreuz* (Der Bundespräsident,

⁴⁰ Although this award has so far only been bestowed three times.

⁴¹ We do not include the *Medal of the “Justicia de Aragón”* as it has so far only been bestowed once.

⁴² For an overview of the development of the British Honours System see: <https://bit.ly/2WV9i3E>.

2017)⁴³ went up from 16 to 25 in 2007 %, when the former President of the Federal Republic, Horst Köhler, adopted a politic that favoured awarding to women, after what this valued raised to 30.5 % in 2009 a value that over the last decade has gone up to 35 % (2019)⁴⁴, although during this period the overall number of bestowals was reduced by 40 %⁴⁵, as the German presidency sought to avoid an “inflation” of orders, thus imposing much more restrictive bestowing, especially supressing any “awarding by custom” (Müller-Neuhof, 2016) as still occurs in Spain with the Order of Carlos III and others. For its part, the *Légion d’Honneur* (De Chefdebien and Galimard-Flavigny, 2002)⁴⁶ shifted from a feminine quota of 8 % in 1985 to 18 % in 2006, showing from then on a clear tendency towards a more equal distribution between genders, as shown by the fact that already in 2005 the numbers of women proposed for the *Légion* reached 50 %, accomplishing exact equality in 2019 when the order was bestowed “réparties à parité exacte hommes et femmes”⁴⁷. However, the French case seems to be the only one in which equality has really been reached. Instead, both in the UK and Germany, the percentage of bestowing to women seems, after an initial impulse, to have become stuck around 35 %, a value close to that presented in Spain by the *Order of Alfonso X*, the *Order of the Constitution*—the only one to reach parity between men and women—and the *Order of Carlos III* in the categories of “Grand Crosses”. However, and despite their shortcomings, those measures have evidently been shown to be effective, if only to a certain degree. Thus, it seems quite astonishing that Spain has to date not adopted any measure to favour gender equality in the bestowing of civil orders⁴⁸.

Which measures should then be implemented to overcome this bias against women? Basically, we account for three different options. The first, and most efficient one, consists in imposing female quotas, legally setting that 50 % of all bestowing should be to women. However attractive this measure might seem due to the immediacy of its effects, this option should be treated carefully as it might cause a number of bestowals not by merit but by quota,

⁴³ For a (critical) review of the recipients of the *Bundesverdienstkreuz*, see Brandt (2015)

⁴⁴ <https://bit.ly/2WW9Bvr>.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ For a history of the Grand Masters of the Order, see Chaffanjon (1983). Cf. also *Code de la Légion d’Honneur et de la Médaille Militaire: Edition 2018*. La Bibliothèque Juridique

⁴⁷ <https://bit.ly/2LmHyQg>.

⁴⁸ In the Spanish case, this is even more surprising as this question seems to have been so far completely neglected even by the Ministry of Gender Equality.

thus discrediting not just the bestowal to women but, in general, the underlying merits rewarded by the order.

A second option, less effective than the previous, consists in the Head of State recommending a rise in the bestowals to women, such as occurred in Germany, or has happened in Spain in the reviewed regulations for the Royal Academies. This option avoids mere “quota bestowal” but may be very slow in its implementation.

Finally, a third option, and the one favoured by the authors of this article, consists in establishing a 50% gender quota in the number not of *bestowing* but of *proposals*, out of whom the corresponding committee selects whom to award to according to pure criteria or merit. This option avoids any risk of unjustified bestowal and will accelerate convergence towards overall (i.e., average) parity in a relatively short time. However, in order for the result to be successful, it has to be accompanied by three additional requirements: an absolute limit of bestowals should be set so as to avoid duplicating the number of proposals/bestowing, as this would imply an inflation of awards and, thus, a devaluation of the merits underlying their bestowal (see the above case of Germany); and a revision of some sections of certain orders (such as the *Order of Agrarian Merit* in its “Fishery” section) where women might be, in fact, underrepresented; finally bestowal “by custom” should be suppressed. Germany has given a good example of the latter: originally, all members of the *Bundestag* (the parliament) received the medal of the *Bundesverdienstkreuz*; currently it can, at most, be bestowed upon one-third of the members of the parliament, after careful revision of each one’s specific merits over the whole legislature. Finally, Spanish Laudative Law suffers from a proliferation of regional orders that complement the already complex system on national awards, without any agency coordinating them.

Regarding the need for a general revision of Spanish Praemial System, we share the proposals of reform pointed out by Ceballos-Escalera and García-Mercadal (2003: 47-48).⁴⁹ These would allow the Spanish System of Civil Orders to be strengthened again, correcting its current inflationary, discriminating and too often erratic application:

- a. Enforcing the role of the Crown as a recognitive tie of the Spanish System of honors and awards. Therefore, the orders should be accompanied by a solemn and ceremonious act of bestowing, articulated around the figure of H. M the King, thus following the British model.

⁴⁹ Cf. also Baumert and Roldan (2011)

- b. A drastic simplification of the currently existing orders, maintaining only those with a deep-rooted-tradition—awarding them according to rigorous and precise criteria—combining the rest in the Order of Civil Merit (*Orden del Mérito Civil*), thus avoiding any duplication among them.
- c. The creation of a single Chancellery of Orders, Awards and Medals, that should depend directly on the Presidency.
- d. Restoring the Direction of Protocol of the State (*Jefatura de Protocolo del Estado*).
- e. Reviewing the current status of the Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, Montesa and Alcántara.
- f. It would be very useful if the orders could present themselves according to the model of the *Légion d'Honneur*—and others—with their own webpage,⁵⁰ presenting their statutes, publishing information and news related to the order, organising exhibitions, maintaining a historical archive, etc., thus providing the government structure of the orders with an objective, putting to an end the current opacity that characterizes them.

It might be stressed that in spite of b), the reactivation of orders, such as the recent restoration of the Medal for the Merits in Research (*Medalla al Mérito en la Investigación*)—originally bestowed in 1980—might be very useful.

Adopting these measures will not only favour a more equal but also a more virtuous society.

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⁵⁰ www.legiondhonneur.fr

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ANNEX 1. DESCRIPTIVE DATA

Percentage Descriptives						
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>
Order of the Agrarian Merit (all sections)	1979-1989	Men	7	93.0991	12.21336	4.61622
		Women	7	6.9009	12.21336	4.61622
		Total	14	50.0000	46.23967	12.35807
	1990-1999	Men	4	96.8750	6.25000	3.12500
		Women	4	3.1250	6.25000	3.12500
		Total	8	50.0000	50.44445	17.83481
	2000-2009	Men	8	95.8333	11.78511	4.16667
		Women	8	4.1667	11.78511	4.16667
		Total	16	50.0000	48.68645	12.17161
	2010-2018	Men	5	96.0000	8.94427	4.00000
		Women	5	4.0000	8.94427	4.00000
		Total	10	50.0000	49.21608	15.56349
Order of Alfonso X	1979-1989	Men	11	89.7727	17.01344	5.12974
		Women	11	10.2273	17.01344	5.12974
		Total	22	50.0000	43.96442	9.37325
	1990-1999	Men	8	91.4931	17.35417	6.13562
		Women	8	8.5069	17.35417	6.13562
		Total	16	50.0000	46.01675	11.50419
	2000-2009	Men	8	81.5797	14.78620	5.22771
		Women	8	18.4203	14.78620	5.22771
		Total	16	50.0000	35.60642	8.90160
	2010-2018	Men	9	68.2347	16.20177	5.40059
		Women	9	31.7653	16.20177	5.40059
		Total	18	50.0000	24.47694	5.76927
Order of Constitutional Merit	1979-1989	Men	2	97.7686	3.15568	2.23140
		Women	2	2.2314	3.15568	2.23140
		Total	4	50.0000	55.21857	27.60928
	1990-1999	Men	7	100.0000	.00000	.00000
		Women	7	.0000	.00000	.00000
		Total	14	50.0000	51.88745	13.86750

Percentage Descriptives						
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>
Order of Constitutional Merit	2000-2009	Men	5	75.4545	43.31320	19.37025
		Women	5	24.5455	43.31320	19.37025
		Total	10	50.0000	48.86217	15.45157
	2010-2018	Men	7	65.7920	46.47096	17.56437
		Women	7	34.2080	46.47096	17.56437
		Total	14	50.0000	47.56052	12.71108
Order of Carlos III	1979-1989	Men	11	83.0254	25.40017	7.65844
		Women	11	16.9746	25.40017	7.65844
		Total	22	50.0000	41.91734	8.93681
	1990-1999	Men	10	76.1667	23.85721	7.54431
		Women	10	23.8333	23.85721	7.54431
		Total	20	50.0000	35.49565	7.93707
	2000-2009	Men	10	73.5505	17.18850	5.43548
		Women	10	26.4495	17.18850	5.43548
		Total	20	50.0000	29.38898	6.57157
	2010-2018	Men	7	69.4428	21.70665	8.20434
		Women	7	30.5572	21.70665	8.20434
		Total	14	50.0000	29.01787	7.75535
Order of the Civil Merit	1979-1989	Men	11	95.2277	5.05863	1.52523
		Women	11	4.7723	5.05863	1.52523
		Total	22	50.0000	46.55449	9.92545
	1990-1999	Men	10	93.1104	3.65081	1.15449
		Women	10	6.8896	3.65081	1.15449
		Total	20	50.0000	44.37288	9.92208
	2000-2009	Men	10	85.2091	7.46201	2.35969
		Women	10	14.7909	7.46201	2.35969
		Total	20	50.0000	36.84666	8.23916
	2010-2018	Men	9	82.2037	13.99642	4.66547
		Women	9	17.7963	13.99642	4.66547
		Total	18	50.0000	35.81148	8.44085

Percentage Descriptives						
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>
Order of Isabel la Católica	1979-1989	Men	11	85.6010	6.11153	1.84269
		Women	11	14.3990	6.11153	1.84269
		Total	22	50.0000	36.92364	7.87215
	1990-1999	Men	10	88.5027	5.47986	1.73288
		Women	10	11.4973	5.47986	1.73288
		Total	20	50.0000	39.86138	8.91328
	2000-2009	Men	10	82.5756	5.12051	1.61925
		Women	10	17.4244	5.12051	1.61925
		Total	20	50.0000	33.79142	7.55599
	2010-2018	Men	9	85.5336	13.50844	4.50281
		Women	9	14.4664	13.50844	4.50281
		Total	18	50.0000	38.84141	9.15501
Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort	1979-1989	Men	11	99.3007	2.31932	.69930
		Women	11	.6993	2.31932	.69930
		Total	22	50.0000	50.51161	10.76911
	1990-1999	Men	10	91.4672	15.22813	4.81556
		Women	10	8.5328	15.22813	4.81556
		Total	20	50.0000	45.05243	10.07403
	2000-2009	Men	9	93.7841	8.35969	2.78656
		Women	9	6.2159	8.35969	2.78656
		Total	18	50.0000	45.77761	10.78989
	2010-2018	Men	9	90.3880	17.19882	5.73294
		Women	9	9.6120	17.19882	5.73294
		Total	18	50.0000	44.78329	10.55552

Source: Own elaboration.

ANNEX 2A. LEVENE TEST (HIGHER CLASSES OF ALL ORDERS)

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Percentage					
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Levene Statistic</i>	<i>df1</i>	<i>df2</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Order of the Agrarian Merit (all sections)	1979-1989	.000	1	12	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	6	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	14	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	8	1.000
Order of Alfonso X	1979-1989	.000	1	20	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	14	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	14	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	16	1.000
Order of Constitutional Merit	1979-1989	.	1	.	.
	1990-1999	.	1	.	.
	2000-2009	.000	1	8	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	12	1.000
Order of Carlos III	1979-1989	.000	1	20	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	18	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	12	1.000
Order of Civil Merit	1979-1989	.000	1	20	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	18	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	16	1.000
Order of Isabel la Católica	1979-1989	.000	1	20	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	18	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	16	1.000
Order of San Raimundo de Peñafort	1979-1989	.000	1	20	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	16	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	16	1.000

Source: Own elaboration.

ANNEX 2B. LEVENE TESTS (LOWER CLASSES OF ALL ORDERS)

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Percentage					
<i>Order</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Levene Statistic</i>	<i>df1</i>	<i>df2</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Order of Agrarian Merit (all sections)	1979-1989	.176	1	20	.680
	1990-1999	.049	1	18	.827
	2000-2009	.249	1	16	.624
	2010-2018	2.790	1	6	.146
Order of Alfonso X	1979-1989	4.219	1	16	.057
	1990-1999	.252	1	16	.622
	2000-2009	.016	1	16	.900
	2010-2018	6.379	1	16	.022
Order of Carlos III	1979-1989	.000	1	16	1.000
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	1.000
	2000-2009	.000	1	18	1.000
	2010-2018	.000	1	16	1.000
Order of Civil Merit	1979-1989	.648	1	20	.430
	1990-1999	1.532	1	18	.232
	2000-2009	.002	1	18	.966
	2010-2018	.414	1	16	.529
Order of Isabel la Católica	1979-1989	2.988	1	20	.099
	1990-1999	.030	1	18	.865
	2000-2009	.357	1	18	.558
	2010-2018	.632	1	16	.438
Order of San Raimundo de Peñafof	1979-1989	.086	1	20	.772
	1990-1999	.000	1	18	.999
	2000-2009	.000	1	18	.996
	2010-2018	.111	1	16	.743

Source: Own elaboration.